Governments have many tax tools at their disposal to redistribute wealth from one segment of the population to another, such as income, sales, and lump-sum taxes (for example, setup fees for corporations). This article studies the interaction between three types of taxes in an economy plagued with insurance fraud. The author presents a case where an excise tax on insurance benefits is the preferred form of taxation because it reduces insurance fraud in the economy. The optimal tax combination is to use all the proceeds from the indemnity tax to subsidize premiums and to use a lumpsum tax to fill the government's coffers. This tax scheme allows a government to reach the first best allocation in the limit, even in the presence of market imperfections (ex post moral hazard). When the government's cost of administering the tax scheme increases in the indemnity tax rate (a Laffercurve argument), it remains optimal to redistribute all proceeds from the indemnity tax as premium subsidies; the first best is no longer attainable in this case, however.
INTRODUCTION
One reason that modern governments are unwilling to use lump-sum taxes (also known as poll taxes) may be that to do so corresponds to political suicide. This is true even if a lump-sum tax is generally perceived as the most efficient form of taxation. Although lump-sum taxes are efficient when perfect information is available, this may no longer be the case when information is not perfect. The general argument against a head tax is that it provides no insurance in case of an unlucky draw. However, a wage tax, as in Eaton and Rosen (1980) , or a corporate tax, as in Peck (1989) , provides some insurance in the sense that agents who have a lucky draw (higher wage or profit) end up paying more in taxes.
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The model presented here examines the incidence of different taxes on the welfare of agents when markets are imperfect. The approach the author will take is one where a worker may suffer an injury that prevents him or her from working. This introduces some income uncertainty for the worker. Although the worker faces uncertainty regarding the future the author allows an insurance market-namely a workers compensation or disability insurance market-to exist to insure against that uncertainty. This differs from Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Peck (1988 Peck ( , 1999 , where no insurance market exists.
The market imperfection the author introduces is that the existence of the disability is known only to the worker and not known for certain by the insurance company unless it conducts a costly audit of the disability insurance claim. This means that the worker may have the incentive to misreport the true state of the world to extract more money from the insurer. This approach, known as the costly state verification approach, was pioneered by Townsend (1979) . Reinganum and Wilde (1985) , Mookherjee and Png (1989) , Picard (1996) , and Bond and Crocker (1997) also use this approach.
In such a setting, the traditional approach has been to say that the insurer can commit to an auditing strategy such that it is in the worker's best interest to always tell the truth. Unfortunately, it may not be credible for the insurer to commit to such an auditing strategy, as argued by Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde (1986) , Picard (1996) , Khalil (1997) , and Boyer (1998) . Suppose the insurer announces an auditing strategy such that workers have nothing to gain by falsely reporting the state of the world. If the worker believes in such an audit strategy, then he or she will always tell the truth. The insurer, on hearing the worker's report, has no reason to audit since audits are costly and will only reveal that the worker has told the truth. By not auditing, the insurer saves the cost of auditing, which means that commitment may not be credible. Consequently, workers, anticipating the insurer's unwillingness to audit, will want to lie. Therefore the principal-agent problem between the insurer and the worker is not solved.
The author demonstrates in this study that the first best allocation may be attainable in the limit if the government is allowed to use three tax instruments: a tax on insurance premiums, a tax on insurance indemnities, and a lump-sum tax. The optimal scheme is then to redistribute all the revenues generated using the indemnity tax as premium subsidies and to use the lump-sum tax solely to garnish the government's coffers.
These results stem from the insurer's inability to commit to an auditing strategy because, in equilibrium, some workers claim for disabilities that do not exist, and, more importantly, some workers are not caught claiming for a disability that does not exist. This means that some workers collect benefits to which they are not entitled. With a benefits tax, proportionally more of the tax is borne by workers who lied to their insurance companies. This is not the case with a lump-sum or a premium tax, which is borne equally by every worker in the economy. Moreover, by taxing benefits, one may reduce insurance fraud in the economy. Fraud is reduced even more if monies collected using the benefit tax are redistributed to workers in the form of premium subsidies.
In an adverse selection context, Crocker and Snow (1985) also show that a tax-forsubsidy may be Pareto improving. Their tax scheme requires that low-risk individuals be taxed to subsidize high-risk individuals. This increases the utility of both types of agents.
The remainder of the article is divided as follows. In the next section, the author presents the basic assumptions and the sequence of play between the government, the insurer, and the worker. In the subsequent section, the author develops the model. The author first presents the game played by the worker and the insurer, given the taxes chosen by the government in the initial period. The optimal combination of taxes is then presented. Finally, the author concludes with a discussion of the results.
BASIC PROBLEM

Assumptions
The author first presents the assumptions of the model and discusses some of the most important ones. The first six assumptions are typical of a costly state verification problem as in Townsend (1979) , Reinganum and Wilde (1985) , and Mookherjee and Png (1989) , although Reinganum and Wilde's agent is risk neutral. Using only two possible states greatly simplifies the problem in two ways. First, it reduces the action space of the worker to only two actions: report a disability and do not report a disability. Second, it guarantees a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies for the game in which the worker and the insurer are involved. The disutility suffered in case of a disability (the term D in Assumption A.2) is there only to guarantee that workers do not become disabled on purpose.
A.1.
Assumption A.6 needs some further explanation. The penalty inflicted on workers when they are caught represents prison time. This penalty is paid by the worker but is not collected by anyone in the economy. Therefore, it represents a deadweight loss to society. Assumption A.7 means that the labor income a worker earns is unobservable by any other player. Therefore, the insurer cannot decide to audit the worker's labor income instead of the worker's disability and also that it cannot ask the government to audit the worker's labor income. This is important in the sense that, if the worker's labor income could be observed, the insurer would know for certain whether or not the worker is disabled, since a truly disabled worker cannot earn labor income. The impossibility to observe the worker's labor income also means that the government cannot tax labor income. This is why the taxation schemes are restricted to the three types of taxes presented in Assumption A.9.
Assumption A.8 refers to the presumed impossibility for the insurer to commit to an auditing strategy. Khalil (1997) uses the case of the regulation of a monopolist with unknown cost to explain the logic behind the principal's inability to commit to an auditing strategy. He writes, "since the optimal contract induces the agent to comply with the contract, from an ex post perspective the principal has no incentive to audit" (1997, p. 629) . It is known that it is possible to design a contract whereby it is optimal for the agent to always tell the truth. This revealing contract in a costly state verification world relies on the assumption that the principal can commit to an auditing strategy ex ante. Ex post, however, no incentive exists for the principal to audit since it knows that the agent told the truth, as truth telling is always his or her best strategy. By not auditing, the principal saves the cost of auditing. Even if the contract stipulates an auditing strategy, it is in the ex post best interest of both players to renegotiate such a contract, for instance, by splitting the saved cost of auditing between them.
Finally, Assumptions A.9 and A.10 present the tax mechanism available to the government in this economy. The government needs to levy some amount G. The fact that government collects taxes before the insurer plays increases the penalty paid by workers who wrongfully filed a claim. This tax-collection procedure does not penalize workers who truly suffered an accident, since they are indifferent to when taxes are collected. It is true that agents must pay a tax on benefits denied. This may be viewed as an extra penalty an agent must pay in case he or she is found guilty of fraud.
1
Timing
The sequence of play is shown in Figure 1 . In the initial stage, the government sets the taxes to raise some amount of money 0 G s in the least painful way for the workers. This tax must be collected from the workers. The government can raise G using three types of taxes: a lump-sum tax (T), an excise tax on disability insurance premiums É p t , and an excise tax on disability benefits claimed É b t .
FIGURE 1 Sequence of Play
The government chooses the taxation scheme that maximizes the worker's expected utility.
The disability insurance contract is signed between the workers and the insurer. Specifies coverage and price.
Nature decides whether the worker is disabled.
Worker sends message to the insurer: disabled or not.
Government collects taxes.
Insurer decides whether to audit the worker's disability claim.
Payoffs are paid to the worker, the insurer, and the government. In Stage 1, the insurer offers a disability insurance contract to the worker. This contract specifies coverage in case of a disability and a price that yields zero expected profits to the insurer. This contract does not specify an audit strategy, since such a strategy is not enforceable by the courts. The price of the insurance contract takes into account the worker's incentive to commit fraud with some probability.
In Stages 2, 3, 5, and 6, the disability insurance claiming game between the insurer and the worker is played. This is a game of asymmetric information, in which the worker knows the true state of the world (whether he or she is disabled) and in which the insurer does not unless it incurs an audit cost. Before the cost of auditing is incurred, the insurer does not know whether the message it received is truthful. This means that it cannot a priori differentiate a truthful message from an untruthful one. Payoffs are paid in the last stage of the game.
The government, which collects taxes in Stage 4, receives g per worker in expectation. The payoffs to the insurer and the worker depend on the actions taken by each player and nature, and on the taxation system chosen by the government.
The Model
This game between the government, the insurer, and the worker is solved using backward induction. The author first derives the equilibrium to the disability insurance claiming game between the insurer and the worker. 2 Second, the author derives the optimal disability insurance contract the insurer sells to the worker. Finally, the optimal taxation scheme will be derived.
Claiming Game
The payoffs to the worker and the insurer are given in Table 1 . 
The contingent states in italics never occur in equilibrium; they represent actions that are off the equilibrium path.
It is clear that the equilibrium of the game is Perfect Bayesian. A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) is such that no player has any incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy and that the insurer has posterior beliefs in each of its information sets that were updated using Bayes' rule. The game's PBNE in mixed strategy is unique, 3 and is solved in the following proposition: 
B T U Y t p W t B T k where p t is the premium tax rate, p t is the benefit tax rate, and T is the lump-sum tax. The variable i p (I) represents all possible combinations of taxes, I = (T, p, b), i.e., i is element of the power set the different taxes. 4
Proof: All the proofs are in the Appendix.
The intuition behind this equilibrium is straightforward. A worker who is truly disabled will never want to report that he or she is not disabled, and an insurer with whom no claim is filed has no reason to audit. The mixed strategy of a player is such that the other player is indifferent between its two possible actions. The worker sets his or her probability of filing a claim when he or she is not disabled such that the insurer is indifferent between auditing (with probability i v ) and not auditing; while the insurer sets its probability of auditing when a disability is reported such that the worker who is not disabled is indifferent between reporting a disability (with probability i I ) and telling the truth. Note that for i I (0, 1), it has to be that It can be seen that the shape of the equilibrium is independent of the taxation scheme used. The worker always files a claim if he or she is disabled, and the insurer never audits if no claim is filed. The only things that change are the equilibrium weights assigned to each action in each of the players' optimal strategy when a mixed strategy is used. This property of the equilibrium will simplify the analysis when the optimal contract between the worker and the insurer is considered.
Insurance Contract
The problem for the insurer is to find a contract that maximizes the worker's expected utility given the taxation scheme chosen by the government in the initial period, given a zero-profit constraint for the insurer, and given that the worker and the insurer play the claiming game. The maximization problem is
( 1) and is subject to four constraints:
and
The first constraint is the zero expected profits constraint for the insurer. This constraint states that the premium the insurer collects must be equal to its expected payout. This expected payout includes the benefit paid, both to those who truly had a loss (4) and (3) represent the PBNE strategies of the players. When designing the contract, the principal must anticipate rationally what strategies will be played. The fourth constraint is the participation constraint. It states that the agent must be better off buying this contract than in autarchy.
This problem seems complicated to solve with two variables and four constraints. Fortunately, by substituting Constraints (4), (3), and (2) into Equation (1), the maximization problem simplifies to
The participation constraint is redundant, since at 0 
which we know yields a maximum since Equation (6) is concave. This necessary firstorder condition may be rewritten as
where
5 To save space and to make the reading easier, the following substitutions were made:
is needed to achieve an optimum. To see why, note that the left side of Equation (7) . We know from Equation (7) Q is a sufficient condition for i I to be a probability.
When the number of workers in the economy is large, the total tax raised from each worker using a poll tax, an excise tax on premium, and an excise tax on benefits are, 
. The tax each worker pays is known for certain for both the lumpsum and the premium tax and is the same for all workers. This is not the case with a benefit tax, since each worker's tax liability is not the same. Workers pay tax rate t b on all benefits claimed. They file a claim with probability
. 6 The expected amount of taxes paid is thus I yields the desired result.
Effect of Taxes
The probability that fraud is committed is given by i I , which decreases when i B increases for any type of tax. To see why, consider what the insurer must pay if it does not audit. If the insurer has more to lose by paying a claim, then the worker will need to reduce his or her probability of committing fraud to keep the insurer indifferent between auditing and not auditing. The impact on fraud of the three taxes is stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2:
(1) A premium tax always increases fraud;
(2) A benefit tax reduces fraud if the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is high enough; and (3) A lump-sum tax increases fraud if the utility function displays decreasing absolute risk aversion.
6 With probability p a worker is disabled (in which case he or she receives the insurance benefit), and with probability É In each case, the tax does not directly affect the probability of fraud. Rather, the taxes have an impact on benefits only. Since an increase in benefits decreases the probability of fraud (i.e., 0 B
I v v
), it follows that the impact of any tax on fraud is the same as its impact on benefits. Boyer (2000) shows similar results, but in an automobile insurance context.
It is interesting to observe that, if the worker is sufficiently risk averse, then an increase in the benefit tax will induce him or her to choose a contract where the insurer pays a greater amount in benefits. Consider the two effects when taxes are levied on disability benefits. First, there is the value of insurance; second, there is the disutility of paying taxes. Ceteris paribus, a more risk-averse worker is willing to accept more disutility because he or she values more insurance, which is provided only through after-tax benefits. This means that, to receive a similar after-tax benefit, a more riskaverse worker needs to increase pre-tax benefits when taxes increase. He or she is willing therefore to pay more in taxes than a less risk-averse worker.
Since benefits paid by the insurer are greater, it has more to lose by not auditing. This means that the worker must alter his or her optimal reporting strategy to take into account this increased incentive for the insurer to audit. It is clear from looking at the worker's equilibrium reporting strategy that an increase in the benefit paid by the insurer reduces the worker's probability of filing claim when he or she is not disabled. The benefit tax also has an impact on the payoff of workers, since they receive lower after-tax benefits than before. Therefore, workers have less to gain by filing fraudulent claims, which means that they should be less willing to make them. The insurer is then able to reduce its equilibrium probability of auditing, thus reducing the amount of money devoted to auditing.
The impact of a premium tax is completely different from that of the benefit tax. The premium tax is similar to a proportional loading factor on the premium. It is then normal to expect the equilibrium benefit paid to be smaller. What this does is reduce the insurer's monetary incentive to audit, which means that the worker must increase his or her probability of fraud for the insurer to remain indifferent between auditing and not auditing.
Under the reasonable assumption that the worker's utility function does not display increasing absolute risk aversion, a poll tax will also increase fraud in the economy. The reason is that a lump-sum tax uniformly reduces the wealth of workers, irrespective of their choice of insurance contract. With utility functions that display nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, poorer workers choose indemnity payments closer to the actual loss they may suffer. Since the equilibrium benefit is greater than the loss, benefits are lower when workers are poorer. Fraud therefore increases with the size of the poll tax.
Therefore, workers may strictly prefer an excise tax on disability insurance benefits to a lump-sum tax because it reduces the amount of fraud in the economy and thus reduces waste. Also, a disability benefit tax has redistributive effects such that those who bear the greatest burden relatively are the workers who were successful in filing for disability benefits when they were not disabled. The trade-off between the effi-ciency of the lump-sum tax and the redistributive effect of the excise tax on disability insurance benefits is more clear when the government is allowed to combine the different tax instruments.
Optimal Tax Scheme
Assume then that the government needs to raise some amount g from each worker. Can the government increase the workers' expected utility using the different taxes? The answer is yes. The author shows that if the government is allowed to use all three tax schemes, it should use the entire proceeds from its disability insurance benefit tax to subsidize premiums; the lump-sum tax is then used only to garnish the government's coffers (in the sense that the amount collected through the lump-sum tax is exactly equal the government's budget needs).
The government knows what impact its choice of tax will have on the optimal contract, just as the insurer knows how the contract affects the claiming game. These taxes are chosen optimally even if they lead to subsidies (negative taxes). The problem faced by the government is
subject to the tax constraint 7 The subscript on the benefit B is dropped for the rest of this study; doing so will not confuse the reader.
This proposition has the interesting implication that, whatever the government's budgetary needs, it should always use all the revenues generated by taxing insurance benefits to subsidize premiums. The budgetary need of the government should then be collected through a lump-sum tax (poll tax).
The reason why this tax scheme is optimal is that all social loss because of insurance fraud (cost of auditing and penalty paid in case an agent is found to have committed fraud) is driven to zero as the indemnity tax goes to one. For this to occur, the probability of audit (given in Equation 4) must go to zero. To have 0 v n , either t n faster than B n e . The reason audits are no longer conducted is that workers no longer have any reason to commit fraud; they have nothing to gain. Thus no resources are wasted in audits.
Also, the probability of fraud is driven to zero as B n e . A worker files a fraudulent claim with probability
. Because B n e , 0 I n . Since no one commits any fraud and since no one is ever audited, it follows that the social optimum is attainable in the limit.
By setting the indemnity tax rate very high, the social optimum is attainable in the limit. It then becomes logical to have the lump-sum tax be used exclusively to collect the required amount of money for the government since it is the optimal form of taxation (the one that distorts behavior the least) when information is perfect. Put differently, the premium tax and the indemnity tax are used only to mitigate fraud, and government revenues are collected using the least distorting tax that exists, which is the lump-sum tax.
The tax collection process is peculiar in this study, especially when it comes to the collection of the insurance benefit tax. Recall that the tax is collected on benefits claimed, which includes both paid and denied claims. This means that the total amount collected in taxes (assuming T = 0) is equal to É There is therefore no difference in the way the tax on insurance benefits is collected since, in the limit, both approaches lead to a first best allocation.
Of course, letting the tax rate approach one and the indemnity payments approach infinity may not be possible. The author's approach only shows that a very high indemnity tax rate would be optimal. It is paradoxical that insurance indemnity payments are never taxed in reality since taxing indemnities instead of premiums puts a larger burden on agents who commit fraud. This can be illustrated using a simplistic example. Agents commit fraud with probability I . The principal audits with probability v. Let B still represent the benefit, p the premium, and Q the probability of a being disabled. With a benefit tax b t , agents who are able but commit fraud (which occurs with probability É 1 Q I of the total tax bill since they are taxed on benefits claimed rather than on benefits received only. With a premium tax or a lump-sum tax, it is possible to show that fraudulent agents pay a proportion É 1 Q of the total tax bill. Given that 1 I , it follows that
. 8 This means that the proportion of the total tax bill that falls on the lap of fraudulent agents is greater when a benefit tax scheme is used instead of a premium tax.
One may now wonder what would happen is one of the taxes was not available to the agents. In other words, what would happen if only two tax schemes were available? The author presents this last result in the following corollary.
Corollary 1
In the neighborhood of 0 g n , if the government has access to only two tax schemes, it is optimal to (1) tax benefits and subsidize premiums; (2) tax benefits and offer a lump-sum award; and (3) have a lump-sum tax equal to government needs and not tax premiums.
The first part of this corollary tells the same story as Proposition 3. This proposition states that the optimal tax scheme when the three taxes are possible is such that T = g, The second part of this corollary states that workers prefer to over-tax disability benefits to subsidize all workers through lump-sum payments. By taxing disability benefits, the government levies proportionally more money from workers who commit fraud. By allowing the government to redistribute these taxes through lump-sum subsidies to all workers in the economy, the government is raising overall utility. The third part of the proposition, that only a lump-sum tax will be levied, comes from the fact that both the premium and the lump-sum tax treat all workers in the same way, so that everyone in the economy ends up paying the same amount in tax. In other words, neither the premium nor the lump-sum tax discriminate against workers who lie. It is clear therefore that if g = 0, then the government will not levy any tax. If the government needs to pay for some expenditures, it is better for the workers that the government only levy a lump-sum tax. This is because premium taxes introduce inefficiencies that do not exist with a lump-sum tax. It is interesting to note that setting the premium tax to zero in this case is in no way determined by the level of government expenditures. For any g, the workers are better off if the government never taxes premiums.
Costly Collection of Taxes
The last result the author wants to present relates to the cost of collecting these taxes. Suppose it is costly to administer the tax-for-subsidy program. More precisely, suppose the cost depends on the insurance benefit tax rate such that 
B t t T g t B c
Q and the first-order condition of the optimal choice of a disability insurance contract
This approach guarantees an interior solution, which leads to the last proposition of the study.
Proposition 4:
If it is costly to administer the taxes, the optimal taxation scheme will be such that . Furthermore, assuming the following functional form,
This last proposition confirms the results presented in Proposition 3. Even when the cost of levying a benefit tax increases in the tax rate such that setting the tax rate to one is prohibitively expensive, it remains optimal to use all the funds generated through the indemnity tax in the form of insurance premium subsidies. The lumpsum tax instrument is then only used to fill the government budgetary requirements. It is clear that if it is extremely costly to administer the benefit-tax-for-premium-subsidy program (for example when É 0 gb is very large), then it will become optimal to have a very low tax rate on insurance benefits. When it is not costly at all
, then the same situation as in Proposition 3 occurs.
By putting a cost of levying an indemnity tax more than proportional to the tax rate, an interior solution is guaranteed to the maximization problem of the government. This cost of levying taxes is used extensively in the public finance literature where it is often found that, past a certain point, an increase in the tax rate reduces government revenues. The economy cannot reach a first best allocation, however, when the cost of levying taxes increases as the tax rate increases. The first best allocation could only be achieved when the indemnity tax rate approached one while the indemnity payment approached infinity.
CONCLUSION
This article presented a simple model where workers, who face uncertainty regarding their ability to work (they may become disabled through no fault of their own), may purchase insurance to mitigate this uncertainty. The workers, however, have proprietary information concerning their ex post ability to work. This means that they have an incentive to misreport their conditions to collect disability benefits to which they are not entitled. If the insurer is not capable of committing credibly to an auditing strategy, workers may commit fraud in equilibrium by falsely announcing that they are disabled.
In such an economy, the author was able to observe the strategic use of taxes to increase welfare when the money collected using one tax instrument is redistributed to workers through a subsidy. More to the point, the author showed that the optimal combination of taxes is such that the government should subsidize insurance premiums using the proceeds generated through the indemnity tax. This tax-for-subsidy scheme is the result of the workers' willingness to see their benefits taxed, since it lays a relatively greater burden of the tax on those workers who committed fraud and were not caught. Any government budgetary need should then be levied through a lump-sum tax. These results hold whether the cost of levying the benefit tax increases in the tax rate or not.
These findings may be of interest to policymakers in an environment where workers may commit insurance fraud (whether it be disability insurance fraud, healthcare fraud, or workers compensation fraud). Because insurers may not be able to commit credibly to an auditing strategy, the government may want to tax insurance benefits and redistribute the money collected to all the participants in the economy through lump-sum subsidies or premium subsidies.
There are two possible extensions at this point that may be worth pursuing in the future. The first relates to the inclusion of agents who never engage in fraud at all for moral reasons. Picard (1996) shows that it is impossible to design a contract that separates opportunistic agents (those who play the game) from honest agents. By including honest agents who never benefit from crime, it seems logical to expect that there is an even greater social good in taxing benefits and giving lump-sum subsidies. The reason is similar to those exposed in this study: Fraud is reduced, and a greater tax burden is laid on opportunistic agents.
The second possible extension would be to study the gain in welfare for agents who could not purchase insurance before, and who can now thanks to a premium subsidy. In the model, there was no exogenous premium loading. If there existed a loading, then it is quite possible that some agents would have chosen not to purchase insurance. By subsidizing premiums through benefit taxes, the government could increase welfare by allowing agents to have access to more affordable insurance.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1:
The solution to this game is a sextuple found through backward induction. Looking at the left side of Figure 2 , it is clear that 0 DF B . Filing a claim (FC) dominates not filing (DF), whatever the insurer does, when the worker is disabled. When the agent plays DF, the insurer knows with certainty that it is at the lower node of the left-side information set. Consequently, the insurer never audits when the agent plays DF. This is straightforward, since the insurer gets p i -c if it audits and p i if it does not. Consider now the right side of the figure.
FIGURE 2 Extensive Form of Game
Let v i be the probability (in a mixed strategy sense) of auditing a filed claim. The insurer's strategy must be such that the worker is indifferent between filing a claim and not filing, given that he or she is not disabled. To do so, v i must solve
All that is left to calculate is the belief of the insurer on the right side of the information set and the strategy of the worker given that he or she is not disabled. Let i I be the probability (in the mixed strategy sense) that the worker files a claim when he or she is not disabled. Using Bayes' rule, we find FC B , the insurer's posterior belief that the worker is indeed disabled:
It is a condition that FC
B must be such that the insurer is indifferent between auditing and not auditing. Thus 
Since all six elements have been found, the proof is done.· 9 Note that one must assume that for the reporting probability to be in the zero to one interval. If not, then the agent will always commit fraud when he or she has a low loss.
A sufficient condition is to assume that 1 2 Q since, as seen in the first-order condition,
.
Proof of Proposition 2:
In all three cases, it is sufficient to show the impact of taxes on benefits, since taxes have no direct impact on the probability of fraud. Let 
be the first-order condition of the problem. 
It is clear that c . Thus, as the poll tax increases, the equilibrium benefit decreases and fraud increases. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The author first set up the problem and then proceeded with the three proofs. 
Using the definition of 9 given in Equation (8), the six first-order conditions are 
Substituting and simplifying, we are left with 
